Science and society — a mutual relationship

Inarguably, there is a reciprocal relationship between science and society. History has shown that this relationship has sometimes been confluent, and other times, somewhat more strained. Irrespective of which philosophical perspective one might assume to view scientific progress (for example those offered by Dewey, Feyerabend, Kuhn, Nagel, Peirce, Popper, et al. — either alone or in combination), it’s evident that science is nested within the temporal and cultural contingencies of the human condition, inclusive of its epistemic capital, values, biases, and goals. Science also contributes to this, and so the mutuality of inquiry, insight and social-cultural attitudes becomes evident.

The influence of neuroscience

Historically, a number of scientific, fields, endeavors, and trends have shaped both the worldview(s) of the time – and those of today. Over the past twenty years, neuroscience has assumed a progressively prominent role in this regard, and there is a vibrant — and I believe defensible — sentiment, that the brain represents the “next frontier” of scientific exploration and discovery. Through the use of iteratively more advanced knowledge and techniques, neuroscience has enabled an enhanced understanding of nervous systems at a variety of levels. At present, we have a generally solid working knowledge of the substrates and mechanisms of neurological structure and function, respectively — that is, what neural cells and networks are made of, and the activities of these cells and structures.

However, we have just begun to fit this into a fuller conceptualization of brain function as complex dynamical process of system-nested-within-systems, and the overall functions natural systems, at large. Perhaps what’s more (if not most) important is that we can only speculate about the possible ways that consciousness, or this function called ‘mind,” could occur in brain — the “how’s it do that?” question of the exact ways that a is obtained in/from b – what philosopher David Chalmers classifies as one of the principal “hard problems” of neuroscience1. As well, while we might posit that manifesting consciousness confers apparent survival and evolutionary benefit, more existential if not somewhat transcendental questions remain about how and why nervous systems obtain and entail ever-increasing complexity that enables consciousness to occur, and to what ends such complexification — and expanding cognition — could lead.

Neuroscience — a work in progress

Despite the omnipresent hard problems, neuroscience is being increasingly employed to assess and affect thought, feeling, behaviors, and more broadly, constructs of normality. Yet, far too often neuroscientific outcomes and information are misperceived, and misused to wage arguments that are inappropriate or fallacious. Misperception and/or misuse can results from miscommunication of what neuroscientific date actually mean. Philosopher Michael Pakaluk and I have advocated discernment of “hard” from “soft” neuroscience: the former being that which is actually produced and disseminated within the scholarly community, while the latter tends to be that which is excerpted, or in some cases, bastardized in the extra-academic sphere. There are a number of reasons why “hard science” goes soft,” but suffice it to say that fault can lay on both speaks to the shared responsibilities of science and public media to avoid what my colleague at Oxford, Roger Scruton, refers to as “neuro-nonsense.” Indeed, as Matthew Crawford has claimed, there are limits to “neurotalk,” and these need to be recognized and appreciated2.

What “neuro” really means …

To be sure, we’re faced with what I’ve called “neuro-ubiquity,” in that the neuro prefix is frequently being attached to a number of disciplinary concepts (e.g., neuroaesthetics, neuroeconomics, neurolaw, neuromarketing, neurospirituality/theology, etc.). While I feel that it is important to attempt to define what and how neural substrates and mechanisms are involved – and contribute to – the human activities of these various fields, I am concerned about using incipient, misconstruing, or “cherry-picking” neuroscientific information. I believe that this warrants address and consideration of what neuro really means, by confronting the capabilities and limitations of neuroscience. I argue that the neuro prefix should more appropriately “call forth the discourse” about what is known and not known about brains and consciousness, and should recognize that neurosis strives to depict brain functions on levels of – and in relation to – activity from the synaptic to the social scale.

The neuro prefix prompts inquiry to the laws that neurobiology affects and is affected by psychological and environmental factors. This sustains a view of neural systems – and their functions – as embodied within a being that is embedded within and responsive as well as contributory to a particular set of environments. Moreover, such an approach vests neuroscience to a systems’ model and allows for bio-psychosocial orientation in the strict sense, as originally espoused by George Engel, that acknowledges biological foundations, but equally values the complementarity and reciprocity of the innervated being and its world.

And what we do with it

It is in this spirit that I offer an apologia for neuroscience. The field has become increasingly consilient by incorporating both the sciences (e.g., anatomy, engineering, pharmacology, physiology, physics, social sciences, etc.), as well as the humanities (e.g., philosophy, ethics, etc.). The breadth and depth of neuroscience – as a discipline and a social force – necessitates a heightened responsibility for 1) pragmatic assessment, 2) frank communication of (actual) findings, and 3) prudent use of information, outcomes and tools in the medical and social realm.

I maintain that there is great value to “neuro-knowledge” in that it allows “bottom up” insight to the ways that organisms function in relation to others and environments. But caution is required, for here we encounter the mechanistic paradox: History illustrates that humans are seemingly compelled by a need to know, explain and control the natural world, and construct tools and techniques toward these ends; yet we must confront and recognize the pull – and consequences – of utilizing and acting upon partial knowledge and understandings as demiurge, what philosopher Hans Lenk has termed the “technological imperative3.” Certainly, this is the case for neuroscience and its technologies. The tools of neuroscience have become evermore prominent as means to access, evaluate and manipulate brain structure and function, and such information and capacity, while nascent and contingent, have far-reaching potential to affect ethical, legal and social norms, status and deeds.

Neuroethics: The first tradition — “neuromorality”

The use of neuroscience as a tool to explore and affect the brain – mind at once substantiates the two “traditions” of neuroethics: the first addressing the possible neural bases of moral sense, cognition, emotion, and behavior; and the second attending to the ethical issues that are generated by neuroscientific research and the application of its knowledge and products in healthcare and society. I have argued that neuroethics in the first tradition may serve as a form of meta-ethics, in that it enables some understanding of those cognitive and emotional processes that function in moral sentiment, decisions, and behavior. Employing the neuroprefix appropriately, neuroethics (as neuromorality) could provide a sharper lens through which to perceive those ways that humans (and perhaps other species) obtain, develop, and manifest moral capabilities as part of their interactions with others. But, I believe that this approach is valid if – and only if – situated within a bio-psychosocial system’s model. It is likely that humans possess certain proto-ecological sensitivities that are then inculcated and reinforced through a variety of experiences and environments. It is important to bear in mind neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s description of neural systems as providing an organism with an internal “feeling of what happens” in relation to the events of its social milieu4. Thus, neuromorality is useful to describe those internal functions that are operative in, and contributory to feelings of “rightness” and/or “wrongness” – and not as the singular constituents of morality, but as derived from and responsive to those influences (e.g., family, friends, society, at large, etc.) that affect an organism’s cognitions, and activities (if not overall existence). I do not view this as overtly reductive. Instead, I posit that this conceptualization establishes a naturalistic framework for moral decision-making that comports well with the philosopher Owen Flanagan’s notion of ethics as “human ecology” enacted in the psycho-social domain5.

Neuroethics: The second tradition — ethical concerns about neuroscience

There is much that we can do with neuroscience and its tools, but in each and every case, it is important to consider what should be done, given the constraints of neuroscientific knowledge, socio-cultural realities, extant moral constructs, and the potential to use any scientific and technological tool to evoke good or harm. Here, we encounter neuroethics in the second tradition, namely, those ethical issues that arise in and from neuroscientific inquiry and the uses of its outcomes, techniques, and technologies.

At the fore is the need to regard neuroscience as a human endeavor. Therefore, we are responsible for the relative rightness and/or wrongness of the ways that neuroscientific knowledge and interventions are employed. Brain research extends to the boundaries of self-understanding, and may alter the way we view and treat both humans and non-human beings (e.g., animals, artificially intelligent machines, etc.). Furthermore, neuroscience provides means to control cognition, emotion, and behavior. While beneficent motives may drive the use of such capabilities, neuroscience is not enacted in a social vacuum, and thus, such interventions and manipulations are subject to the often capricious influences of the market and political power. So we must still ask how these goods and resources will be distributed, and what effect this allocation would incur on individuals, groups, and society.

Neuroethics as task and tool

It is tempting – or in some cases terrifying – to engage in free-wheeling speculation about possible utopian or dystopian trajectories and valences of neuroscientific progress. White it’s best to keep fact and fiction in their place, sci-fi (and perhaps neuro-ubiquity and neuro-nonsense) can serve as a window and mirror to the social psyche’s hopes and fears about neuroscience, as sci-fi is frequently based upon, and becomes some dimension of science fact. But despite the lure of fantasy, it is imperative to step back from any fictionalized accounts, and focus upon the realities at hand, as neuroscientific fact is more challenging than neuroscience fiction. I maintain that any valid approach to neuroethics requires pragmatism in assessment and prudent responsibility in action. The “observe-analyze-address-proceed” paradigm works well in – and for – neuroethics, lest we fall victim to over-ampliative arguments and/or “ready-shoot-aim” approaches to the use of neuroscience and neurotechnology.

I have argued that a simple precautionary principle is insufficient in that actual assessments of the benefits, burdens, and risks of neuroscience are difficult to determine, given 1) the speed and breadth of its advancement as a frontier science, and 2) the potential for run-away effects or unforeseen consequences (within the field, and in its impact as a social force). We cannot stop neuroscientific progress, nor should we. I have recently stated that it would be unwise and irresponsible to “… ignore the gravitas of neuroscientific information, its impact upon society, the resultant ethical (and legal) situations that will arise, and necessity to make moral decisions about the ways neuroscience and its tools are employed6. In this light, I maintain that neuroethics – in its two reciprocal traditions – will be invaluable to guide the scope and tenor of neuroscience and ethics at present, and ensure preparedness for the contingencies and consequences of neuroscientific progress in the future.

Recommended Further Reading

Giordano J, Gordijn B. (eds.) Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Giordano J, Olds J. “The interfluence of neuroscience, neuroethics, and legal and social issues: The need for (N)ELSI.” American Journal of Bioethics – Neuroscience, 2010, 1(4): 12-14.

Giordano J. “Neuroethical issues in neurogenetics and neurotransplantation technology – the need for pragmatism and preparedness to practice and policy.” Studies Ethics, Law Technol. 2011: 5(1) online.

Glannon W. (ed.) Defining Rights and Wrong in Brain Science: Essential Readings in Neuroethics. New York: Dana Press, 2007.

Levy, N. Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Racine E. Pragmatic Neuroethics. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010.

Verplaeste J, DeSchrijver J, Vanneste S, Braeckman J. (eds.) The Moral Brain: Essays on the Evolutionary and Neuroscientific Aspects of Morality. Dordrecht: Springer, 2009.

  1. Chalmers D. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. NY; Oxford University Press, 1996. ↩︎

  2. Crawford M. In: Giordano J, Gordijn B. (eds.) Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. pp. ↩︎

  3. Lenk H. Technokratie als Ideologie: Sozialphilosophische Beitrage zu einem politischen Dilemma. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1973. ↩︎

  4. Damasio A. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. NY: Harcourt, 1999. ↩︎

  5. Flanagan O. The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. ↩︎

  6. Giordano J. “Neuroethics: Interacting traditions as a viable meta-ethics.” American Journal of Bioethics-Neuroscience 2011 (in press). ↩︎