Jane Goodall’s work has been groundbreaking in many ways. Her approach to the study of chimpanzees could almost be described as anthropological, treating those who happen to have no grammar-based language as equals. The moral consequences of being able to successfully engage in such an endeavor are vast, calling_ into question much of what we take for granted about the nature of morality and humanist beliefs. While instinctual behavior is increasingly used for understanding human morality, Goodall’s focus has always been on the human treatment of the nonhuman world. I argue that drawing moral inferences from nonhuman to human behavior can be problematic, because humans are capable of communicating using grammar-based languages. It is a specifically human responsibility to counteract the destructiveness that our language capacity has enabled. Goodall’s approach towards taking this responsibility could be characterized as augmenting our language-based moralities with the perspectives of nonhuman and human, future and current life. While Goodall has received much credit for her observations of chimpanzees, modern culture has yet to follow her lead by adapting our beliefs about justice to make them consistent with our scientific understanding.